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SUMNER MARCUS*
Participation by private firms in the design and manufacture of weapons systems
has increased enormously since the beginning of World War I. The increase has
resulted both from a step-up in the amounts expended on defense as well as from
the transfer of the major responsibility for defense production from public agencies
to private firms.
In 1939, expenditures for defense by the federal government were only about a
billion dollars and constituted only 1.2 per cent of the Gross National Product
(GNP). At their peak during World War II they were $8i billion and amounted
to thirty-eight per cent of the GNP. In 1948, even at their lowest postwar point,
they were $ii.8 billion or 4.5 per cent of the GNP. Since 1955 they have amounted
each year to between nine and ten per cent of a GNP now nearing the $6oo billion
mark'
Before World War II, arsenals operated by the federal government produced
almost all Army ordnance items and a good share of Navy ordnance and ships.
The only important class of articles produced exclusively by private firms was air-
craft. During World War II, the bulk of weapons-making in all fields shifted to
private firms and has stayed there. By 1958, government-owned and operated
facilities comparable to those of private defense contractors accounted for less than
ten per cent of the resources devoted to weapons-makings
Today a very substantial portion of the efforts of some of the largest firms in
the country is devoted to contracts for products with a governmental end use.
Large firms such as Republic Aviation Corporation, McDonnell Aircraft Corporation,
and Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation sell less than ten per cent of their
output to customers other than the government and its prime contractors.?
During the last few years, as might be expected, studies and analyses of the
implications of these important changes in the defense procurement process have
begun to appear in ever increasing numbers. Considering the social and economic
importance of the subject, it is surprising that there were so few significant studies un-
til quite recently. The subject has finally begun to command increasing attention, how-
ever, from a variety of academic disciplines as well as from the various governmental
*A.B. X931, M.B.A. 1933, LL.B. 1936, Harvard University; D.B.A. 1958, University of Washington.
Professor and Chairman, Department of General Business, College of Business Administration, University
of Washington.
'AM. J. Pacx & F. M. Scmuamra, Tm W.APoNs AcQmsmroN PRocEss oo (1962).
'Id. at 98-99.
'NVEDENBAUM, Tim TRANSFEAEILITy OF DEFENSE INDusTRY RE ouRcEs TO CIvILIAN USES, STATEMENT
PREPAPxD FOR THE SuacossrrrER oN MANPOWER OF Tm SENATE COMMirrER ON LABOR AND PuBLIc
WELFARE 6-7 (Nov. 21, 1963); see also Hannah, Government by Procurement, x8 Bus. LAw. 997, 998
(1963).
20 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
and private organizations concerned with the acquisition of weapons systems and
other defense articles and services. The current knowledge of the field is now being
enhanced constantly by the hearings and reports of congressional committees, by the
reports of governmental agencies-the Department of Defense and its constituent
agencies, the Comptroller General, the Bureau of the Budget-and by the studies of
private organizations concerned directly and indirectly with the defense procurement
process and the "remarkable political economic system" it has spawned. The
present symposium makes a further significant contribution to our understanding
of the nature and implications of the defense contracting process.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest the directions taken by studies of the
postwar defense contracting process and to summarize some of their significant
conclusions.
A meaningful analysis of studies of the defense contracting process requires at
the outset some classification or breakdown of these studies by the purpose or ob-
jective. Accordingly, it is proposed to discuss previous studies of the defense con-
tracting process under the following headings:
(i) studies of the law and procedure of defense contracting
(2) studies of how the defense contracting process actually operates
(3) studies of the impact of defense contracting upon the economy as a whole
or upon some segment of the economy, such as small business, and
(4) studies of the political implications of the modern defense contracting process.
I
STuDIEs oF TmE LAw AND PRoCEDURE OF THE DEFENSE CONTRACTING PROCESS
Studies of the defense contracting process until fairly recently have dealt mainly
with the formal statutes, regulations, and directives describing the procedures em-
ployed by the government in acquiring articles and services from its private
suppliers. This is not surprising in the light of the great volume and complexity
of ever-changing regulations, particularly since the enactment of the Armed Services
Procurement Act in I948. Contracting officials, defense contractors, and other
students of the defense contracting process have needed all the help that they could
get even to begin to understand the outlines of the pertinent voluminous defense
contracting regulations, let alone the more esoteric interpretations of them in specific
cases.
Relatively few of these treatments of the formal law and procedures of defense
contracting have attempted to cover the entire field. The earliest, and at this
writing still perhaps the most comprehensive, is Navy Contract Law, prepared
by members of the Office of the General Counsel of the Navy Department. The
first edition was published in 1949; it was updated in 1959 and 1961 and analyzes
'62 Stat. 21 (1948), 10 U.S.C. § 2301-14 (958).
'U.S. NAvY DEP'T, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, NAVY CONTRACT LAW (2d ed. x959).
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both from an historical and contemporary point of view the formal procurement
procedures employed by the contracting agencies of the three military services.
The student of the defense contracting process will find it to be an excellent starting
point for his researches into specific facets of the process. Later this year, there will
also be available a multi-volume treatise on government contracts which one
reviewer expects to be "the most comprehensive, all-embracing, and authoritative
work in the government contracting field."'
There is a rather substantial journal literature of varying quality concerning
various facets of the defense contracting process. The character and volume of
this have changed markedly since World War II when commentators on defense
contractors concerned themselves mainly with the law and procedures of renegotia-
tion and termination. By 196o, we find articles dealing with the entire gamut of the
defense contracting process.7 The current symposium, which deals with a very wide
range of topics, does not even contain an article on renegotiation or termination.
On the other hand, it treats the policies and formal procedures relating to fair employ-
ment, conflicts of interest, and small business, which are not as thoroughly under-
stood.
II
STUDIES OF How THE DEFENSE CONTRACTING PROCESS OPERATES
The matter of how the pertinent laws and regulations have been applied to
individual contractual transactions has not received as much attention from students
of the defense contracting process as the regulations themselves. This has not
resulted, however, from lack of interest. Rather, the information available to the
student has been quite scanty due to the natural reluctance of the government and
the defense industries, like suppliers and purchasers everywhere, to expose their
activities to the gaze of those not immediately concerned with their transactions.
The procedures of contracting agencies and other governmental units concerned
with the relationship between the defense industry and the government have tended
to be like icebergs; only a relatively small part of them have been open to in-
spection. Notwithstanding the thousands of pages of government publications con-
taining statutes, directives, regulations and instructions which assault and often con-
found the student of the procurement process along with its participants, they do
not by any means answer all the important questions, and sometimes they may even
give an erroneous impression of the policies and procedures that are actually em-
ployed.
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An example of such an important discrepancy between formal regulation and
practice has been in regard to the profit element included in the price of certain
negotiated contracts. The regulations of the contracting agencies have always seemed
to contemplate that contracting officers would take into consideration a variety of
factors in determining the profit or fee element of the total price of a contract. These
factors include the degree of risk assumed by the supplier, the nature of the work
to be performed, the extent to which he received assistance from the government,
the extent of the supplier's investment, the supplier's past performance in defense
contracts, and the like. Since individual contracts varied greatly in respect to these
various factors, it might have been assumed that there would be substantial varia-
tions in profits between various contracts awarded the same contractor and even
greater variation between those awarded different contracts for different kinds of
articles and services.
However, studies made in 1961 by Cherington and Scherer and in x962 by the
Logistics Management Institute confirmed what had been suspected right along-
namely, that it was "quite rare for negotiators to make any systematic evaluation"
of these factors and that each contracting office developed historical patterns so that
target profits tended to cluster closely around a norm for particular contractors and
particular types of contracts. Moreover, there was no great difference between the
highest and lowest target profits for all contractors of a particular class. The target
profits for cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts ranged between 5.5 per cent and
7.5 per cent, for price-revision contracts between eight per cent and 9.5 per cent, and
for firm fixed price contracts between ten per cent and twelve per cent. Discussions
by representatives of Arthur D. Little, Inc. with defense contractors-perhaps con-
cerning a later period-suggest that the profit for fixed price contracts was between
nine and ten per cent.?°
Defense agencies are not, of course, the only organizations which have different
purposes and procedures than the ones described in their official publications and
utterances. There are two circumstances, however, which militate particularly
against greater disclosure of the way in which the defense contracting process works.
One is that much of the effort of the agencies is concerned with the acquisition of
weapons, the very identity and quantities of which must sometimes be concealed
for purposes of national security. Perhaps even more important, however, is the
traditional reluctance of buyers to disclose to their potential suppliers just how they
carry on their business. This coming together of the traditions of military and
industrial secrecy has doubtless contributed substantially to the failure of defense
contracting agencies in the past to make more explicit just what they do and what the
results of their efforts are.
Nor can the needed information be obtained readily from the defense contractors
themselves. Even data on profitability of defense contracts is "extremely difficult to
*U.S. DEP'T or DEFENSE, PROFITS iN DF. FsE CONTRACTING 1-2 (Aug. 8, 1963).1 0 ARTmui D. ,rrLrE, INC., How Sicx Is T"nE DEFENSE INDusTm? 43 (I963).
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obtain,"' notwithstanding that the aggregate financial results of public corporations
are usually available. One difficulty, of course, is that no breakdown is made between
government and civilian business. This stems from the ordinary reticence of firms
in a competitive market to disclose to their competitors or to their customer any
more information than is necessary about their financial operations.
But all this has begun to change as the Congress and the top echelons of the
Department of Defense have subjected the processes of the defense contracting
agencies to closer scrutiny. Before 196o, the only important governmental source of
information concerning the prices and profits in the contemporary procurement
process to which the public had access was the occasional investigation made by a
congressional committee.'"
The first comprehensive studies of contemporary procurement policies and
practices were conducted by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in
i96o. The hearings and reports of these committees which were based on these
studies have provided much information for subsequent studies of the defense
procurement process.'" More recently, in 1962, the Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Operations has made an extensive study of profits and costs in the missile
procurement program.'4 This is a substantial contribution to the relatively small
pool of information concerning defense contracting. And in the same year the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation in its "Report on the Renegotiation Act of
i951" secured from the Renegotiation Board and made public important data con-
cerning defense costs and profits which had not theretofore been made available.' 5
The most comprehensive non-governmental study to date has been that of the
"I Id. at 43.
" See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on
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Weapons Acquisition Research Project of the Harvard Business School. The pur-
pose of the three year project is "to determine the nature of the relationships between
the government and weapons contractors in the acquisition of advanced weapons
and to analyze the effects of these relationships on weapons acquisition and the
speed and cost of their production."'" The first volume by Peck and Scherer presents
an economic analysis of the weapons acquisition process and contains much valuable
information concerning the process which would not be otherwise available.
A second recent study of importance is that of the Stanford Research Institute
for the Aerospace Industries Association 7 It contains significant information
obtained from the records of a number of aerospace companies as well as analyses
of this and other available information of the type already mentioned.
Another recent study of importance is by the private consulting firm of Arthur
D. Little, Inc. and designed to help their clients understand "the complex structure
of the defense industry."18 The report contains many stimulating and provocative
analyses and interpretations.
It is apparent from all these reports that one of the principal difficulties with
existing defense contracting policies and procedures is the lack of guidelines. To
one student, everything "seems open, fluid, and ad hoc.""9  "It is doubtful . . .
that anyone has a very useful view of what the 'public interest' is in the contract
system."2 This is because many divergent public policies are involved in the ad-
ministration of procurement. Some of them are squarely in conflict. The defense
contracting official must decide in a given case whether his principal purpose is to
accomplish a particular program in the aerospace field at the lowest cost to the
government, or to be certain that governmental regulations are being fully observed
in the expenditure of public money, or to help accomplish a broad national aim,
such as economic growth or the maintenance of competition, or to make certain
that no firm realizes excessive profits, or to insure the survival of a viable defense
industry, or something else 1
As is always the case when several governmental agencies are assigned responsi-
bility to carry out or to review a particular program, the principal role of the agency
determines the relative emphasis given by the officials in that agency to the various
public policy goals involved. Thus, it may be assumed that the defense contracting
agencies have, in the past, and will continue in the future, to emphasize in their
activities the importance of the development and acquisition of superior weapons
systems. At the same time, it is also apparent from the recent studies in this field
that procedures which have been developed in connection with the fixing and review
'o PECK & ScnExRR, op. cit. supra note i, at ix.
'
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18 ARnius D. LiTTE, INC., op. cit. supra note io, at iii.
19 STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 17, Pt. II, at 14.
20 Ibid.
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of the compensation of defense contractors may interfere with the achievement by the
defense agencies of this basic objective.
In the first place, according to these studies, the viability of the defense industry
is gradually being impaired by governmental measures which adversely affect and
will continue to affect the profitability of the industry. There has been a long
continuing debate between governmental officials, particularly officials of the
Renegotiation Board, and the defense industry, concerning how profitable the in-
dustry has been. This debate has centered about the selection of the base employed
to measure profitability. Those contending that the profits of the industry have been
or are inadequate are impressed particularly by the low profit-sales ratios in the
industry. And there is no question but that defense contractors' profits as a per-
centage of sales have declined steadily over the past few years 2  On the other
hand, those who have regarded defense profits in past years as high, or even too
high, point to the consistently higher than average return on net worth of the
companies involved. Fortune reported that the return on sales in 1961 of the aircraft
industry (2.2 per cent) was the lowest of any of the twenty-one manufacturing
industries, while the return on invested capital (11.6 per cent) was the third highest23
The Renegotiation Board and the Tax Court have found profits of the aircraft in-
dustry to be "excessive" in some years in the past, largely because of this relationship
between profits and net worth. 4
Additional bases of comparison have been used in some of the recent studies
of the defense industry and its relationship with the government. The Stanford
Research Institute compared the return on total assets of the defense industry with
that of a cross-section of industry because, in its opinion, such a rate provides a
comprehensive measure of performance of how effectively, from a profit standpoint,
all of the firm's economic resources are employed, and because it eliminates the
effect of the particular financing method employed. The Institute found the
industry's rate of return, measured in this way, to be below that of industry in
general.25 The Little study, in making its comparisons, attempted to determine
the contribution of government-furnished facilities to the profits of the industry and
to evaluate the consequences to the industry of the decline in the amount of such
facilities in the future which will result from changes in governmental policy.
The report concluded that the impact of governmental assistance on profits has
been great in the past 6 At the same time, the authors of the report "do not believe
that the defense industry is on the brink of disaster," notwithstanding the probable
continuation into the foreseeable future of the trends toward decreasing returns on
sales and on equity, and the ever-rising requirements for funds for modernization,
research, and replacement of government investment. 7  Individual defense con-
An2Artmm D. LITTe, INc., Op. cit. supra note io, at 53.
22 1d. at 54.
'" See, for example, Boeing Airplane Co. v. Renegotiation Board, 37 T.C. 613 (1962).
2 5 STANwopm RESEARcH INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 17, Pt. I, at 47-48.
ARrnm D. LrrrLE, INc., op. cit. supra note io, at 68.
27 1d. at 85.
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tractors who are inefficient, however, are likely to be "severely hurt" in the future.8
Another factor militating against the achievement of superior weapons systems
is the failure to evolve a system of adequate incentives for optimal performance on
the part of the defense industry. Notwithstanding an elaborate set of regulations
designed to give contracting officials the utmost discretion in allowing substantial
differentials between the compensation of the most efficient defense contractors
and the least efficient, recent studies of the Department of Defense indicate that, in
general, contracting officials adopt a target fee or profit for a given type of contract
in a given industry and then proceed to use this target in arriving at the compensa-
tion for all contracts negotiated with the various firms of the industry29 The study
explains rather graphically how this comes about:8 °
Many contracting officers choose the expedient solution to their quandary: through
experience, they arrive at a profit or fee rate that is well below the maximum permitted
but high enough that the contractor will accept it, and they use these few rates over a
long period for all contracts they negotiate, regardless of contractor or situation. As time
goes on, they tend to lower the rate slightly, to establish themselves as good bargainers.
The virtues of the "magic number" system are obvious: The contracting officer has little
risk of spurring an investigation by the General Accounting Office if the rate is stable
and trending downward, the contracting officer's superiors (who are in a poor position
to evaluate the reasonable nature of the costs) are pleased at what appears to be hard
bargaining, and finally, the contractor feels some sense of continuity-the known fee of
today may be better than earnest negotiation on each contract may yield tomorrow. The
drawback to this system is that it tends to become universal and ignores the individual
characteristics of each situation.
The Department of Defense is hoping to get away from this undesirable uniformity
by, among other things, requiring the use of a checklist and point system calculated
to bring about the desired differences in treatment between various defense con-
tractors0 1  "Whether the program will succeed is questionable and, based on
historical examples, unlikely."8 2
Incentives to good performance have also been minimized by the wide use of
CPFF contracts during past years. Under these contracts, the compensation of
contractors is not increased even if they make cost savings or produce a superior
product. The Defense Department is now de-emphasizing contracts without incen-
tives and encouraging the use of incentives in both fixed price and cost type
contracts.8  But this shift to other types of contracts is not likely to be a panacea.
The incentive contracts which have been employed in defense contracting in the
past have not always achieved their intended results. The defense contractor has
281d. at 81.
"0 See p. 22, supra.
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not been assured that he would make additional profits even when he has been
able to perform the contract at less than the target cost. The aircraft industry, in
particular, has been unhappy for a long time about judgments of the Comptroller
General, the Renegotiation Board, and the Tax Court after the event that .the
performance of a contract at a cost below the target might have been due not so
much to the efficiency of the contractor as to the initial setting of the target cost
at an unrealistically high level 3 It must be concluded that the ability of incentive
contracts to accomplish their basic purpose is put into serious question by the
Little study. When the Department of Defense negotiates lower target fees for
cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts than for cost type contracts without the incentive
feature, "contractors are tending to bid at a cost they expect to underrun by a modest
amount (if the competitive situation permits), so that they will collect sufficient
incentive to come out at least as well as under a CPFF contract."35
If the defense contracting agencies have been unable to evolve completely satis-
factory procedures for obtaining the maximum effort from the defense industry, it
is not likely that other governmental agencies, less intimately concerned with the
procurement process and having lesser responsibilities for the acquisition of superior
weapons systems, will be more highly motivated in this regard. The General
Accounting Office conceives its responsibility in regard to the defense contracting
process to be mainly that of insuring literal compliance with procurement regulations
and minimizing the profits of defense contractors. It is impossible to calculate the
dampening effect which this powerful arm of the Congress has had upon the
practices of both contracting officials and contractors. While they have doubtless
been responsible for the recovery or prevention of unjustified profits from some
contractors, they have also clearly encouraged uniformity in the treatment of con-
tractors and have been responsible in part for the disregard by contracting officials,
which we have noted, of the policies designed to discriminate through compensa-
tion in favor of the more efficient contractor. Other agencies, such as the Renegotia-
tion Board, which enter the procurement process only tangentially, similarly may be
expected to gear their policies to their primary mission of profit control, rather than to
other objectives of the defense contracting process.
The health of the defense industry may be adversely affected by certain strategies
which the defense firms themselves employ in vying for government business. De-
fense contractors frequently take a slightly lower fee on a large CPFF contract in
order to make sure that they will be awarded it. This in turn becomes, in practice,
the fee which they must accept on all subsequent contracts36 Another unfortunate
tendency is that of most defense contractors to expend substantial portions of their
resources in attempting to land every contract in sight. This has resulted in a dilu-
tion of the efforts that could be expended on the performance of the contracts them-
" Cf. Heyman, Contractual Problems in Contracting Out, 31 Gao. WASr. L. REv. 77x (1963).
' Anitrm D. LiTt.E, INc., op. cit. supra note io, at 8o.
"Id. at 43.
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selves. Eighteen per cent of the aerospace industry's top scientific and engineering
talent are working on proposals, of which seventy-five per cent are unsuccessfulV7
This circumstance also accounts in part for the overcapacity of the industry which
exists at the present timef s
III
STUDIES OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING
In view of the importance of defense contracting to the economy, it is not sur-
prising that there have also been studies of the precise significance of defense con-
tracting to the economy as a whole, as well as studies of the impact of defense con-
tracting upon the small business segment of the economy. The emerging possi-
bility of partial disarmament has further enhanced the interest in these subjects during
the past several years 9
As might be expected, for the most part these studies have been governmental
studies. A good example of a study of the economic implications of defense pur-
chasing is the staff report to the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the
Joint Economic Committee;40 this describes in some detail the magnitude of current
defense expenditures and the trends during the past quarter-century, the proportion
of expenditures made by each of the various purchasing agencies, and the distribution
of defense expenditures among the fifty states and among the principal defense
contractors.4
Other congressional committees as well as private research organizations have
begun to grapple with the difficult problems involved in transferring defense in-
dustry resources to civilian uses. A recent private study made for a congressional
committee suggests how specialized, and therefore how difficult to convert to civilian
uses, defense personnel and facilities are. Most defense resources are in a relatively
few industry groups, which often are almost completely dependent upon defense
contracts for their income.5
The significance of defense contracts to the welfare of small business has been
studied continually for many years by the Small Business Committees of the Con-
gress, the Small Business Administration, and other governmental agencies. Each
year, the procurement agencies of the government publish the percentage of prime
contracts going to small business firms43  The percentage of prime contracts awards
87 SrANFORD REsEARcH INsTnTurE, op. cit. supra note 17, Pt. I, at g.
" AnTamo D. LiTrLE, INC., op. cit. supra note Io, at 86.
so See EMILE BENOIT & K. E. BOULDING (EDS.), DISARMAMENT AND THE ECONOMY (x963).
40 STA OF JOINT ECONOMIC CoMMnr E, 86aH CONG., 2D SESs., BACKGROUND MATmMAL ON ECONOMIC
ASwcTS OF MArrY PRocUREMENT AND SUPPLY (Comm. Print 196o).
"Id. at 20-32.
" WEIDENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 3.
"
8 A compilation of these reports may be found in Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on
Small Business on the Role of Small Business in Government Procurement, .962-z963, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 35-47 (1962).
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by the military agencies to small business firms rose again in 1962 after it had
declined for several years.44
IV
STUDIES OF SOME POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEFENSE CONTRACTING PROCESS
Another type of study of the defense contracting process that has emerged
recently is concerned with the political implications of the economic system in
which government contracting plays such a large part.
Several recent studies have been concerned, in the first place, with the way that
the ancient device of contract has been used to govern the defense contracting system,
in which both the formal government and private firms play such highly significant
but nontraditional roles. This system, which has been called both "government by
contract" and "administration by contract," permits the bringing to the service of the
government with relative rapidity established and proven work groups and talented
individuals in highly specialized areas; also it is a method of accomplishing regulatory
ends of the government which have little or nothing to do with the acquisition of
defense materials and services.5
The contract has been used for centuries for a great variety of purposes because of
its adaptability. It has been employed to order many diverse human relationships,
as well as relationships between the citizen and the state. What distinguishes the use
in 1964 of the contract device in defense contractor relationships from past uses of
the contract is the vast amount of ground that it covers. Like the collective bar-
gaining agreement between employer and union or the corporate charter and by-laws,
the defense contract has become in effect a constitution which seeks to define in detail
the roles of the parties concerned in the governance of the enterprise in which they
are jointly engaged.46 To regard the defense contract as merely a special kind of
sales contract or a special kind of employment contract is to misunderstand its true
character. Not only does the contract set forth the description and performance
requirements of the article or system being purchased, the compensation to be paid
the producer, and the mode of payment; but in addition it spells out the many re-
strictions on the activities of the defense contractors. For example, they are required
to pay their employees a specified minimum wage, not to discriminate in employment
because of race, creed, color, or national origin, to use only materials of domestic
origin, and to favor small business concerns in making purchases. The contract also
spells out the management decisions which may require approval of, or initiation by,
the government-such as decisions to change the specifications of the article being
produced, to "make or buy," or to enter into subcontracts. Many defense contracts
also differ substantially from the ordinary commercial contract in the power that
"H.R. REP. No. 2569, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1963). The percentage of subcontract awards de-
dined during the latter part of 1962. 1962 S ALL BUSINESS AD MINismAON ANN. RaP. 74 (963).
," Miller, Administration by Contract, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 957, 958 (596I).
"
8 Cf. ResHcsD S. F. Eas.s & C. C. WALToN, CONcEPTUAL FoUNDAnrsomS OF BUSIN.SS 205, 209 (g6z).
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they give the government to adjust the compensation both during the performance
of the contract and afterwards, as well as to examine the books and operations of the
defense contractor in connection with such power.7
The defense contractor, moreover, is subject to regulations which may not even
be contained in his contract. In a recent case, a construction contractor was held
to be subject to the provisions of a termination clause not appearing in his contract
but which was required to be incorporated in his contract by the applicable pro-
curement regulations.48
One aspect of the wide use of contract to order this new, complex industry-
government relationship-an aspect which has struck nearly all students-is the way
that traditional lines between public and private enterprise have been blurred4
On the other hand, it has been suggested that "the line between private and public
action is blurred and always has been blurred in American law.""°
In any event, this casting of private industry and formal government into such
an intimate relationship has evoked varied reactions. Some have had "laments
for the passing of the age of economic freedom and complaints about the oppressive-
ness of government regulations and control." 1 "This lack of a clear-cut separation
of public and private authority and responsibility offends some people."5 2  At the
very least, it is asserted that, if the system is to be continued, the power of defense
agencies to achieve unrelated social goals through contract provisions should be
circumscribed by the restrictions normally applicable to government regulations,
such as the Administrative Procedure Act.53
A leading student of the relations between government and society has this
to say:
54
The basic question bearing on the desirability of the system is whether the already
vastly complex purchasing system should be further complicated by what are, in the final
analysis, political considerations . . .cluttering up procurement contracts with irrele-
vancies . . . . In the main, there is little justification for continuing to regulate by
contract.
T A good summary statement of the purpose and content of defense contract provisions is contained in
NAvy CONTRACT LAw, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 9. See also Miller, supra note 45, and Whelan &
Pearson, Underlying Values in Government Contracts, io J. Pua. L. 298 (z961).
"'G. L. Christian and Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. x963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
954 (1963). See Comment, Contract by Regulation, 32 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 111 (1963).
' SANFORD RESEARCH INsrTrruTE, op. cit. supra note 17, at I8. See also Dupr6 & Gustafson, Con.
tracting for Defense: Private Firms and the Public Interest, 77 POL. Sc. Q. 1x6, 176 (z962); Miller,
supra note 45, at 989; Cleveland, in HARLAN CLEVELAND AND OrHERS (EDs.), ETHICS AND BIGNESS, at XXV
(1962); Heyman, Government by Contract: Boon or Boner?, 21 PUB. ADmIN. REv. 59 (196i); EDWARD S.
MAsoN, THE CORPORAITON IN MOD.EsRN SoCIETY 17 (959).
5
oMiller, supra note 45, at 957; EuGENE V. Rosrow, PLANNINO FOR FREEDOM: THE PUBLIC LAW OF
AFmRICAN CAPITALISM 336 (1959).
5 STANroRD RESEARCH INsTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 17, Pt. II, at ii. "The division between state
and private life, between command and contract, is blurred and replaced by an image of the constitutional
state permeating all society." Cf. Losos, The Impact of the Fourteenth Amendment Upon Private Law,
6 ST. Louis U. L.J. 368, 377 (I96i).
" MASON, op. cit. supra note 49, at 8.
=6o Star. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § xoo et seq. (x958); Hannah, supra note 3, at ioi5.
"Miller, supra note 45, at 965.
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On the other hand, for some students of the defense contracting process, govern-
mental intervention of the kind described is regarded as not only desirable but as an
absolute necessity, particularly when the government designates a private firm as the
manager of an entire weapons system program. "[Since] business is no longer
merely a supplier but a participant in the management and administration of a
public function" through its function of placing extensive subcontracts, private firms
"must ultimately become accustomed to close supervision with the resulting investi-
gations, audits, and other paraphernalia that accompany the spending of taxpayers'
money."''o
Whether or not the amount of governmental control now exercised is, in their
opinion, the right amount, there seems to be a consensus among students of the
procurement process that the contract system is "probably here to stay" since no more
acceptable method has been conceived. 6
CONCLUSION
The studies of the defense contracting system which have been discussed above,
and the present symposium, are clearly only the forerunners of a vast literature in
the field. Some of the groups which have already contributed substantially to our
understanding of the subject are continuing their efforts. In addition other organiza-
tions are about to enter the field.
Obviously effective public policy decisions affecting the defense contracting system
will not be possible without an understanding of the relevant facts concerning the
system. Until very recently, congressional hearings were marked far more by the
heat they gave out than by the light they shed on these difficult subjects; now this
is fortunately all changing. This change not only augurs well for public policy but
also permits the student of government-business relationships in the production of
weapons systems to look ahead with some confidence to the continued availability
of significant data about this most interesting chapter in the environmental studies
of business.57
" Dupr6 & Gustafson, supra note 49, at 176.
ra STANPORD RasEa cH IrsnroTr, op. cit. supra note 17, Pt. II, at 18; Miller, supra note 45, at 967.
The situation in regard to government contracting for research and development is analyzed in a recent
report, U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research
and Development, [the BELL RPoar], S. Doe. No. 94, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). There is an
excellent bibliography, id. at 69.
"t'Excellent bibliographies of books, articles, and reports on the defense contracting process are
contained in STANFOaD RasARtc INsnTUTE, op. cit. supra note 17, Pt. II, at 285-318: Arrtnt D.
Lr r.E, INc., op. cit. stapra note io, at 89-93, and PECK & ScaanR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 712-25. In
addition, significant studies in the field are now being conducted by the Brookings Institute and the
Logistics Management Institute.
